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For many years, supremacy has been rationalized by the European Court of Justice
and in the literature mainly with arguments relying on the effectiveness of EU law
and on its necessity for resolving conflicts between Union law and the laws of the
Member States. A similar connection between supremacy and effectiveness has
recently been made in Pop#awski, where supremacy has, in passing, been declared
the basis for the duty of the consistent interpretation of national law with regard to
Union directives and for state liability.
In light of the most recent supremacy-related decisions by constitutional courts
in Poland and Germany (see also an Order by the BVerfG where it was deemed
important that an “express guarantee specifying the precedence of application of EU
law” is missing from the EU Treaties), these rationalizations seem to have lost their
persuasive power. In a press release by the ECJ following the ultra vires-decision
by the German Federal Constitutional Court in the PSPP/Weiss case – relying on
Adeneler and avoiding the term supremacy or primacy – it was stated that authorities
of the Member States including national courts were required to ensure that EU law
takes full effect, which would be the only way of ensuring the equality of Member
States under the first sentence of Article 4(2) TEU (see also Lenaerts and Fabbrini).
Instead of relying on effectiveness or the equality of Member States, I argue that
supremacy should be seen as being mainly grounded in the individual-centred non-
discrimination standard anchored in Article 18 TFEU.
The rationale for supremacy in the literature: The
weakness of effectiveness
In EU law textbooks, the point has been made, among others, that Union law can
have direct effect in national law and can, therefore, conflict with national law in
specific situations. 1)R. Schütze, European Constitutional Law, 2nd ed. (CUP 2016),
pp. 117-118. See also H. Hofmann, “Conflicts and Integration: Revisiting Costa v
ENEL and Simmenthal II” in M. Maduro and L. Azoulai (eds), The Past and Future
of EU Law – The Classics of EU Law Revisited on the 50th Anniversary of the Rome
Treaty (Hart Publishing 2010), p.60. See P. Craig and G. de Búrca, EU Law: Text,
Cases, and Materials, 6th ed. (OUP 2015), p. 268 on a categorisation of arguments.
However, this only explains why there must be some sort of conflict resolution
mechanism, but not why this must necessarily be supremacy. It is also not sufficient
to rely generally on the fact that the Member States have ceded sovereignty to the
EU.
An argument based on the effectiveness of Union law may be tempting but
is not compelling (see also Lindeboom). 2)Compare also B. de Witte, “Direct
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Effect, Primacy, and the Nature of the Legal Order” in P. Craig and G. de Búrca
(eds), The Evolution of EU Law, 2nd ed. (OUP 2011), p.323, p.329, finding all
arguments not particularly convincing by themselves and settling for the effet utile-
argument as most apposite. Effectiveness has emerged from loyalty as a means
to ensure that Union law takes full effect in national law (see Klamert). According
to the longstanding case law of the Court such as Adeneler, it is the basis for
certain effects of Union directives in the time before the expiry of the deadline for
transposition and a basis for the principle of state liability, among others. Claiming
that EU law must be effective and therefore has precedence over national law which
in turn was the reason for state liability and indirect effect seems at odds with years
of case law linking effectiveness with Article 4(3) TEU but not with supremacy. More
importantly, it confuses cause and effect: Does EU law have precedence in order to
be effective or is it effective because of supremacy?
Moreover, rationalizing supremacy with effectiveness also confounds two distinct
permutations of effet utile (see Potacs). On the one hand, effet utile can mean to
interpret a provison of Union law in order for it to have any effect, ie in order not
to be pointless. On the other hand, it can mean that Union law is interpreted in
order to have a strong or even the strongest possible effect. Union law would not
be ineffectual in the absence of supremacy. As already mentioned, there could be
other forms of conflict resolution such as infringement actions that might be less
effective but that would not render Union law completely meaningless. Supremacy,
in contrast, means awarding the law of the European Union the strongest possible
effect vis-à-vis national law. Relying on effectiveness to justify supremacy would
therefore require admitting that this is the very special form of effect that is sought
for.
Rationalizing supremacy based on equality
There are two different non-discrimination standards in EU law. One concerns
the position of individuals vis-à-vis Union law, the other the position of Member
States vis-à-vis Union law. Article 18 TFEU and its specifications in the provisions
guaranteeing the fundamental freedoms prohibit “any discrimination on grounds of
nationality”. Article 21(1) CFR prohibits discriminations based on ‘special’ grounds
such as sex or age. While these special grounds could also be (and are) protected
within a purely national context, non-discrimination based on nationality is a (logical)
consequence of supranationality (see Somek, p. 215).
These variations of an ‘individual-centred’ equality standard have been
complemented by a ‘member state-centred’ standard first developed in case law
predating the Lisbon Treaty. The Court held that the equality of Member States
would prohibit treating ‘older’ Member States differently from more recently acceded
Member States (see here and here). This standard is now provided in the first part of
the first sentence of Article 4(2) TEU, requiring the Union to respect “the equality of
Member States before the Treaties”.
In Costa/ENEL, the Court argued, among others, that “[t]he executive force of
Community law cannot vary from one State to another in deference to subsequent
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domestic laws, without jeopardizing the attainment of the objectives of the Treaty
set out in Article 5(2) [now Article 4(3) TEU on sincere cooperation/loyalty] and
giving rise to the discrimination prohibited by Article 7 [now Article 18 TFEU]”.
The Court thus found that the denial of supremacy by a Member State would
jeopardize the attainment of the objectives of the Treaty and give rise to (‘individual-
centred’) discrimination based on nationality. Intriguingly, it is not entirely clear which
objectives were referred to. Moreover, Article 18 TFEU (ex Article 7 EC) has never
been applied by the Court or understood in the literature as conferring a right on a
national/resident against its ‘own’ Member State (of residence) in such situation.
I would argue that the reference to (what is now) Article 18 TFEU by the Court,
albeit never repeated, makes perfect sense. While this might not be covered under
a conventional reading of Article 18 TFEU, the prohibition of discrimination based
on nationality could be understood as also including a comparison between the
situation of a person subject to Union law in one Member State with the situation of
a person subject to Union law in (an)other Member State(s). Even if we would not
apply Article 18 TFEU as such, this provision can at least be seen as expressing the
objective or principle that equality must also be upheld in this constellation. ‘Equality
before Union law’ would then be a Treaty objective as referred to in Article 4(3) TEU,
in relation to which Member States must “refrain from any measure which could
jeopardise [its] attainment” (The Polish Constitutional Court, in contrast, seems to
locate supremacy in Articles 1 and 4(3) TEU, compare Klamert, p.72). In this sense,
the equal treatment in light of Union law between persons subject to the laws of
different Member States would be the objective that is jeopardised if Member States
apply national law over Union law. The point then is not that Member States would
have an unfair advantage vis-à-vis other Member States without supremacy but
that it would discriminate individuals in light of Union law. Such discrimination may
concern a denial of rights under a Union directive as well as not being subject to an
independent judiciary.
Relying on Article 4(2) TEU to rationalize supremacy as the Court has done, in
contrast, places too much argumentative burden on this provision, which is neither
supported by its wording which imposes an obligation on the Union and not on the
Member States nor by the case law. Even when relying on the (debatable) concept
that Member States are equals under EU law and ignoring the wording of Article
4(2) TEU, this compounds the principle of supremacy with the principle of solidarity.
According to case law (here and here) it is a breach of solidarity and ‘unfair’ vis-
à-vis the other Member States if one Member State fails to respect common(ly
agreed) rules. Such ‘unfairness’ can perfectly well be addressed with an infringement
action but does (also) not necessarily call for supremacy. Article 4(2) TEU is relevant
here, but ‘only’ because obliging the Union to treat Member States equally entails
treating the persons residing therein differently, complementing the obligation to give
precedence to Union law incumbent on the Member States.
Conclusion
In light of recent developments in the European Union, a stronger rationalization of
supremacy is needed. Instead of the permutation of equality governing the relations
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between the Member States one should look at non-discrimination on the basis of
nationality as guaranteeing individuals in the EU a right not to be treated unequally
before EU law.
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